Showing posts with label FBI. Show all posts
Showing posts with label FBI. Show all posts

Friday, May 18, 2012

Multi-Layered Counterterror Defenses Generally Work Well, Former NCTC Director Argues

- LIMITED DISSEMINATION

HSToday.us; US/1; ATTN:
 
Partners in Pre-ANTI-CRIMEBy: Mickey McCarter
05/17/2012 ( 8:30am)

Multi-layered counterterrorism defenses have safeguarded Americans more than generally acknowledged, particularly as they have deterred individual terrorists from carrying out catastrophic attacks on US soil, argued the former director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Wednesday.

Speaking at the Counter Terror Expo in Washington, DC, Michael Leiter emphasized, "There is no silver bullet to counterterrorism," but insisted that US defenses nonetheless have been largely successful.

"What has in fact worked over and over again, not perfectly but well, is a multi-layered approach to counterterrorism and homeland security," Leiter stated.

Leiter cited the case of Najibullah Zazi, who purchased hydrogen peroxide for making a bomb in Denver, Colo., and drove to New York City with it before his arrest in September 2009.

US authorities relied upon foreign intelligence to track Zazi, who had been trained by Al Qaeda in Pakistan to carry out a terror plot. Federal intelligence agencies shared information with state and local authorities, and he was arrested in coordination with the New York Police Department, Leiter said.

In another case, multi-layered defenses worked well against Faisal Shahzad, the would-be Times Square bomber who attempted to detonate a fertilizer bomb in an SUV in May 2010.

The media portrayed Shahzad's attempt to detonate his bomb as an intelligence failure but US defenses ultimately frustrated Shahzad's plot to blow up Times Square, Leiter insisted.

Reading the headlines, people may ask, "How can we let this happen? How could the intelligence system not detect this guy who had gone back and forth from Pakistan and is now in the middle of Times Square? And the only thing that saved us was a hot dog vendor?" Leiter queried.

But the former counterterrorism director viewed the narrative differently.

First, public awareness is an important part of the multi-layered approach to defeating terrorism, he said. So an important element of defense is the identification of suspicious activity by members of the public, as envisioned by the "If You See Something, Say Something" campaign adopted by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Public awareness campaigns have worked well in other nations that have faced more persistent homegrown terrorist threats like Israel and the United Kingdom.

Although Shahzad did indeed travel to Pakistan for training on how to make a bomb, he limited those trips and thus limited his effectiveness because he was afraid of being discovered, Leiter said.

"He was worried that if he spent too much time in Pakistan then when he came back to the United States, he might be subject to additional screening and might become a suspect for the FBI or DHS to investigate," Leiter declared.

As Shahzad was discouraged from fully participating in terrorist training, one layer of US counterterrorism defenses worked, he argued.

Another layer also blocked Shahzad from being fully successful.

When he went to purchase fertilizer for his bomb, he bought fertilizer without nitrogen -- a lower grade of fertilizer that was not going to create the large explosion that he sought to create.

Shahzad purchased the lower grade fertilizer because he was aware of a tripwire system whereby people selling potentially dangerous bomb ingredients, such as the high-grade fertilizer, know to call local authorities of the FBI when they see suspicious purchases, Leiter said.

"So did the intelligence system find him among all of the noise beforehand? No. Did the intelligence or national security or homeland security system make it less likely that he was going to cause a catastrophic terrorist attack within the United States? Absolutely," he stated.

As such, the multi-layered defense system worked because it reduced the likelihood of a catastrophic terrorist attack, Leiter said.

He stressed that defenses could not stop every terrorist attack in the world, but US defenses still reduce the likelihood of catastrophic attacks and thus have generally been successful.

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[Information contained in BKNT E-mail is considered Attorney-Client and Attorney Work Product privileged, copyrighted and confidential. Views that may be expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of any government, agency, or news organization.]
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Friday, May 11, 2012

It's NSA DAY at the BlackBOX Intel-CENTER!

- LIMITED DISSEMINATION
US/1

Growing State Surveillance: National Security Agency Whistleblower William Binney (April 20, 2012)



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BlackNET MemberJames Bamford: Inside the NSA's Largest Secret Domestic Spy Center (at the bottom of this center column)

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-CyBER-BlackSEC- LIMITED DISSEMINATION
US/1; ATTN: OSINT, AD-Crew; HST/1 & 2; SCI/2; US/12; CID/2; US/5; US/30; YQ/G-1


BKNT--OSSI Open Source Industry Day co-hosted by the National Security Agency!

Thank you for registering for the OSSI Open Source Industry Day co-hosted by the National Security Agency!

There are only about 100 seats remaining. If your partners, associates and coworkers are interested in attending please recommend they register immediately. http://thebridge.oss-institute.org/index.php/calendar/opensourceindustryday

We are quickly running out of exhibitor tables. If your company would like an exhibit table, please register now.
http://thebridge.oss-institute.org/index.php/calendar/opensourceindustryday

If you have purchased a table, please bring the following with you for exhibit.

  • Tablecloth - Your exhibit table is bare. Please bring a cover.
  • Extension Cord - Electricity is available. 12 Ft of cord should be sufficient.
  • Power Strip - If you need it, bring it.
  • Free standing graphics - Attaching graphics to walls is prohibited.
Please let us know if you are interested in setting up on the afternoon of the 29th. We have limited access to the facility prior to 5/30.

All tables are expected to be ready to receive traffic by 0730 on May 30th. Doors will open at 0630 for exhibitors, 0730 for attendees. The continental breakfast will be served in the exhibit area to encourage interaction with attendees.

Information regarding transportation, directions and accommodations can be found here
http://thebridge.oss-institute.org/index.php/component/content/article/14-events/37-industry-day-directions-transportation-and-nearby-hotels

Are you an OSSI Sponsor? If not there is still time before this event. http://www.oss-institute.org/index.php/lbgmembership-informationlbg-mainmenu-41

There is a WiFi signal in the building available for use. Bandwidth will be limited. If you are using the available WiFi please be considerate of others and turn off your WiFi feature when not in use. Your help will lighten the load and potentially make a difference to some who have WiFi only access.

As a registered attendee you will receive a conference package prior to the event. Please print, download, copy or photograph anything you need for that day. As a consideration for the environment there will be no printed schedules or programs. OSSI will have posters with information throughout the conference area.

[Information contained in BKNT E-mail is considered Attorney-Client and Attorney Work Product privileged, copyrighted and confidential. Views that may be expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of any government, agency, or news organization.]


FISA Applications for Covert Surveillance Increased in 2011
By: Anthony Kimery
05/04/2012 ( 9:16am)

Coinciding with an increase in federal investigations of terrorists, espionage and other threats on United States soil that fall under the authority of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and require that applications for covert surveillance be submitted and approved by the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), in fiscal year 2011, the government submitted 1,745 applications to FISC. 

All applications were for foreign intelligence purposes pursuant to FISA to conduct covert electronic surveillance and/or physical searches, to gain access to certain business records (“including the production of tangible things”). They also included requests made by the FBI pursuant to national security letter authorities. 

“The 1,745 applications include applications made solely for electronic surveillance, applications made solely for physical search, and combined applications requesting authority for electronic surveillance and physical search,” Assistant Attorney General Ronald Weich informed Congress through Vice President Joe Biden in the required annual report on FISA surveillance applications by the government. 

“Of these, 1,676 applications included requests for authority to conduct electronic surveillance,” Weich said. “Of these 1,676 applications, two were withdrawn by the government. The FISC did not deny any applications in whole, or in part. The FISC made modifications to the proposed orders in 30 applications. Thus, the FISC approved collection activity in a total of 1,674 of the applications that included requests for authority to conduct electronic surveillance.” 

The government submitted 1,579 FISA applications in fiscal year 2010, including 1,511 for electronic surveillance. 

Government counterterrorism intelligence officials told Homeland Security Today on condition of anonymity that part of the increase in FISA surveillance applications “came about directly from” investigations of thwarted domestic and foreign terrorist plots against the United States in FY 2010 and FY 2011, as well as in response to materials seized in relation to the raid on Osama Bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan and the resulting investigations. 

“The new report says that the government filed 205 applications for business records for foreign intelligence purposes last year, compared to 96 in the previous year,” and that “the number of ‘national security letters’ (a type of administrative subpoena) declined last year,” noted Steven Aftergood, director of the Federation of American Scientists' (FAS) Project on Government Secrecy in his FAS blog, Secrecy News

“In 2011, the FBI requested 16,511 national security letters pertaining to 7,201 US persons, compared to the 2010 total of 24,287 letter requests concerning 14,212 US persons,” Aftergood added. 

“As is usually the case, the FIS Court did not deny any electronic surveillance applications in whole or in part last year, though it made modifications to 30 of them,” Aftergood said. 


[Information contained in BKNT E-mail is considered Attorney-Client and Attorney Work Product privileged, copyrighted and confidential. Views that may be expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of any government, agency, or news organization.]
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UK Protests...continue:



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CyBER-BlackSEC- OPEN SOURCE
HSToday.us; US/1; ATTN: [REDACTED, ET.AL.]


NSA Director Elaborates On DHS Minimum Cybersecurity Standards

By: Mickey McCarter
05/09/2012 ( 9:00am)

The director of the National Security Agency (NSA) recently wrote to Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) to defend comprehensive cybersecurity legislation, such as that championed by Sens. Joseph Lieberman (I-Conn.) and Susan Collins (R-Maine).

On March 27, Army
Gen. Keith Alexander, NSA director and chief of US Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), told a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee that he believes the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should oversee the hardening of the cybersecurity of US critical infrastructure. McCain attacked such reasoning as placing too much control of national cybersecurity in the hands of an inexperienced DHS bureaucracy and as promulgating regulations that would be burdensome to business.

Two days later, McCain wrote to Alexander to ask him to clarify his views on his support of the Cybersecurity Act (S. 2105), the bill sponsored by Lieberman, Collins and others. Alexander defended a significant role for both DHS and NSA in national cybersecurity last week in his response, a copy of which was obtained by Homeland Security Today.

In his letter, Alexander said congressional legislation should bolster information sharing and critical infrastructure hardening.

"If the Department of Defense (DoD) is to defense the nation against cyberattacks originating from outside the United States, it must be able to see those attacks in real time. This requires legislation that, at a minimum, removes existing barriers and disincentives that inhibit the owners of the critical infrastructure from sharing cyber threat indicators with the government," Alexander wrote.

"Additionally, given DoD reliance on certain core critical infrastructure to execute its mission, as well as the importance of the nation's critical infrastructure to our national and economic security overall, legislation is also needed to ensure that infrastructure is sufficiently hardened and resilient," he added.

Businesses currently lack incentives generally to upgrade their cybersecurity defenses to the level required to successfully defend them, the general argued. Setting some minimum security requirements would ensure that owners and operators of core critical infrastructure take measures to harden their networks and thereby discourage adversaries from attacking those networks.

"At the same time, it is important that legislative requirements not be too burdensome," Alexander acknowledged.

In the March 27 hearing and in other forums, McCain contended that the NSA has more cybersecurity expertise and experience, and thus strengthening its cybersecurity capabilities would be more sensible than building up the cybersecurity capabilities of an ineffective DHS.

But Alexander disagreed, saying in his letter that DHS, NSA and the FBI have distinctive and unique roles in national cybersecurity.

"No single public or private entity has all of the required authorities, resources and capabilities; cybersecurity requires a team," Alexander wrote.

The distribution of cybersecurity responsibilities across DHS, FBI and NSA complement one another, forming such a team effort, he said. DHS works to secure unclassified federal civilian networks, to increase the capability of core critical infrastructure and to bolster national resilience. In the event of a significant cyberattack, DHS would coordinate the federal response, Alexander said.

Meanwhile, the FBI investigates, prevents and responds to cyberattacks with its criminal and intelligence authorities as the lead agency for domestic cyberthreat intelligence and attribution as well as law enforcement and domestic counterintelligence. The FBI feeds DHS information to strengthen cybersecurity preparation and protection measures.

The private sector shares information with DHS and the FBI currently, but that information sharing is limited, which weakens the efforts of those agencies to secure cyberspace, Alexander said.

"With respect to both the DHS and FBI roles, the limited, voluntary information sharing by the private sector inhibits the government's ability to protect domestic cyberspace, which is why it must be a key element of any cyberlegislation as I mentioned earlier. It would also greatly benefit DoD, which assists DHS and the FBI with intelligence support in their respective roles," he wrote.

NSA and CYBERCOM must work to defend national assets from foreign cyberthreats. They collect intelligence, attribute attacks, provide guidance for strengthening US national security, and distribute intelligence to DHS, Alexander said.

While DoD relies upon core critical infrastructure to carry out its missions, DoD can work with DHS to secure that infrastructure, with DHS taking the lead on standards for civilian systems, he continued, stressing that doing so would not interfere with DoD reliance on "power, transportation, telecommunications and the Defense Industrial Base (DIB)."

"Pursuant to the administration's proposals, DHS would, in consultation with the private sector and in coordination with DoD and other sector-specific agencies, be responsible for setting cybersecurity requirements and ensuring they achieve a baseline level of security," Alexander wrote. "DoD would share the responsibility to protect the DIB with DHS, support DHS efforts to protect other critical infrastructure and defend the nation in the event of a cyberattack on the critical infrastructure. FBI would be responsible for conducting investigations of intrusion activity in those critical infrastructure networks inside the United States."

DHS cannot protect core critical infrastructure without the assistance of NSA and the FBI, but it is wholly appropriate that it lead core critical infrastructure protection efforts for the private sector, the general emphasized.

McCain expressed concerns that technological innovations could outpace the ability of DHS, or even NSA, to keep up with national cybersecurity defenses.

But Alexander said proposals championed by the White House and envisioned by the Cybersecurity Act would not specify particular technologies and thus ensure maximum flexibility.

"The proposed security requirements in the administration's proposal would not dictate specific measures that may become outdated but rather would require critical infrastructure to achieve security results using methods of their choice," Alexander wrote.

He added, "We expect this approach will actually result in greater innovation, as companies look to the commercial market to produce security products and services that satisfy these requirements. Additionally, it is important to note that the administrations' proposal leverages, rather than duplicates, existing regulatory processes, allows for exemption of certain core infrastructure for which sector-specific regulatory agencies have sufficient requirements and enforcement mechanisms, and explicitly excludes regulation of technology products and services."

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[Information contained in BKNT E-mail is considered Attorney-Client and Attorney Work Product privileged, copyrighted and confidential. Views that may be expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of any government, agency, or news organization.]
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Wednesday, August 24, 2011

Associated Press: With CIA help, NYPD moves covertly in Muslim areas

- LIMITED DISSEMINATION
US/8; US/1



NEW YORK (AP) - In New Brunswick, N.J., a building superintendent opened the door to apartment No. 1076 one balmy Tuesday and discovered an alarming scene: terrorist literature strewn about the table and computer and surveillance equipment set up in the next room.

The panicked superintendent dialed 911, sending police and the FBI rushing to the building near Rutgers University on the afternoon of June 2, 2009. What they found in that first-floor apartment, however, was not a terrorist hideout but a command center set up by a secret team of New York Police Department intelligence officers.

From that apartment, about an hour outside the department's jurisdiction, the NYPD had been staging undercover operations and conducting surveillance throughout New Jersey. Neither the FBI nor the local police had any idea.

Since the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the NYPD has become one of the country's most aggressive domestic intelligence agencies. A months-long investigation by The Associated Press has revealed that the NYPD operates far outside its borders and targets ethnic communities in ways that would run afoul of civil liberties rules if practiced by the federal government. And it does so with unprecedented help from the CIA in a partnership that has blurred the bright line between foreign and domestic spying.

Neither the city council, which finances the department, nor the federal government, which contributes hundreds of millions of dollars each year, is told exactly what's going on.

The department has dispatched teams of undercover officers, known as "rakers," into minority neighborhoods as part of a human mapping program, according to officials directly involved in the program. They've monitored daily life in bookstores, bars, cafes and nightclubs. Police have also used informants, known as "mosque crawlers," to monitor sermons, even when there's no evidence of wrongdoing. NYPD officials have scrutinized imams and gathered intelligence on cab drivers and food cart vendors, jobs often done by Muslims.

Many of these operations were built with help from the CIA, which is prohibited from spying on Americans but was instrumental in transforming the NYPD's intelligence unit.

A veteran CIA officer, while still on the agency's payroll, was the architect of the NYPD's intelligence programs. The CIA trained a police detective at the Farm, the agency's spy school in Virginia, then returned him to New York, where he put his new espionage skills to work inside the United States.

And just last month, the CIA sent a senior officer to work as a clandestine operative inside police headquarters.

While the expansion of the NYPD's intelligence unit has been well known, many details about its clandestine operations, including the depth of its CIA ties, have not previously been reported.

The NYPD denied that it trolls ethnic neighborhoods and said it only follows leads. In a city that has repeatedly been targeted by terrorists, police make no apologies for pushing the envelope. NYPD intelligence operations have disrupted terrorist plots and put several would-be killers in prison.

"The New York Police Department is doing everything it can to make sure there's not another 9/11 here and that more innocent New Yorkers are not killed by terrorists," NYPD spokesman Paul Browne said. "And we have nothing to apologize for in that regard."

But officials said they've also been careful to keep information about some programs out of court, where a judge might take a different view. The NYPD considers even basic details, such as the intelligence division's organization chart, to be too sensitive to reveal in court.

One of the enduring questions of the past decade is whether being safe requires giving up some liberty and privacy. The focus of that debate has primarily been federal programs like wiretapping and indefinite detention. The question has received less attention in New York,where residents do not know for sure what, if anything, they have given up.

The story of how the NYPD Intelligence Division developed such aggressive programs was pieced together by the AP in interviews with more than 40 current and former New York Police Department and federal officials. Many were directly involved in planning and carrying out these secret operations for the department. Though most said the tactics were appropriate and made the city safer, many insisted on anonymity, because they were not authorized to speak with reporters about security matters.

The story begins with one man.
___
David Cohen arrived at the New York Police Department in January 2002, just weeks after the last fires had been extinguished at the debris field that had been the twin towers. A retired 35-year veteran of the CIA, Cohen became the police department's first civilian intelligence chief.

Cohen had an exceptional career at the CIA, rising to lead both the agency's analytical and operational divisions. He also was an extraordinarily divisive figure, a man whose sharp tongue and supreme confidence in his own abilities gave him a reputation as arrogant. Cohen's tenure as head of CIA operations, the nation's top spy, was so contentious that in 1997, The New York Times editorial page took the unusual step of calling for his ouster.

He had no police experience. He had never defended a city from an attack. But New York wasn't looking for a cop.

"Post-9/11, we needed someone in there who knew how to really gather intelligence," said John Cutter, a retired NYPD official who served as one of Cohen's top uniformed officers.

At the time, the intelligence division was best known for driving dignitaries around the city. Cohen envisioned a unit that would analyze intelligence, run undercover operations and cultivate a network of informants. In short, he wanted New York to have its own version of the CIA.

Cohen shared Commissioner Ray Kelly's belief that 9/11 had proved that the police department could not simply rely on the federal government to prevent terrorism in New York.

"If anything goes on in New York," one former officer recalls Cohen telling his staff in the early days, "it's your fault."

Among Cohen's earliest moves at the NYPD was making a request of his old colleagues at CIA headquarters in Langley, Va. He needed someone to help build this new operation, someone with experience and clout and, most important, someone who had access to the latest intelligence so the NYPD wouldn't have to rely on the FBI to dole out information.

CIA Director George Tenet responded by tapping Larry Sanchez, a respected veteran who had served as a CIA official inside the United Nations. Often, when the CIA places someone on temporary assignment, the other agency picks up the tab. In this case, three former intelligence officials said, Tenet kept Sanchez on the CIA payroll.

When he arrived in New York in March 2002, Sanchez had offices at both the NYPD and the CIA's station in New York, one former official said. Sanchez interviewed police officers for newly defined intelligence jobs. He guided and mentored officers, schooling them in the art of gathering information. He also directed their efforts, another said.

There had never been an arrangement like it, and some senior CIA officials soon began questioning whether Tenet was allowing Sanchez to operate on both sides of the wall that's supposed to keep the CIA out of the domestic intelligence business.
"It should not be a surprise to anyone that, after 9/11, the Central Intelligence Agency stepped up its cooperation with law enforcement on counterterrorism issues or that some of that increased cooperation was in New York, the site of ground zero," CIA spokeswoman Jennifer Youngblood said.

Just as at the CIA, Cohen and Sanchez knew that informants would have to become the backbone of their operation. But with threats coming in from around the globe, they couldn't wait months for the perfect plan.

They came up with a makeshift solution. They dispatched more officers to Pakistani neighborhoods and, according to one former police official directly involved in the effort, instructed them to look for reasons to stop cars: speeding, broken tail lights, running stop signs, whatever. The traffic stop gave police an opportunity to search for outstanding warrants or look for suspicious behavior. An arrest could be the leverage the police needed to persuade someone to become an informant.

For Cohen, the transition from spying to policing didn't come naturally, former colleagues said. When faced with a decision, especially early in his tenure, he'd fall back on his CIA background. Cutter said he and other uniformed officers had to tell Cohen, no, we can't just slip into someone's apartment without a warrant. No, we can't just conduct a search. The rules for policing are different.

While Cohen was being shaped by the police department, his CIA background was remaking the department. But one significant barrier stood in the way of Cohen's vision.

Since 1985, the NYPD had operated under a federal court order limiting the tactics it could use to gather intelligence. During the 1960s and 1970s, the department had used informants and undercover officers to infiltrate anti-war protest groups and other activists without any reason to suspect criminal behavior.

To settle a lawsuit, the department agreed to follow guidelines that required "specific information" of criminal activity before police could monitor political activity.

In September 2002, Cohen told a federal judge that those guidelines made it "virtually impossible" to detect terrorist plots. The FBI was changing its rules to respond to 9/11, and Cohen argued that the NYPD must do so, too.

"In the case of terrorism, to wait for an indication of crime before investigating is to wait far too long," Cohen wrote.

U.S. District Judge Charles S. Haight Jr. agreed, saying the old guidelines "addressed different perils in a different time." He scrapped the old rules and replaced them with more lenient ones.

It was a turning point for the NYPD.
___
With his newfound authority, Cohen created a secret squad that would soon infiltrate Muslim neighborhoods, according to several current and former officials directly involved in the program.
The NYPD carved up the city into more than a dozen zones and assigned undercover officers to monitor them, looking for potential trouble.

At the CIA, one of the biggest obstacles has always been that U.S. intelligence officials are overwhelmingly white, their mannerisms clearly American. The NYPD didn't have that problem, thanks to its diverse pool of officers.

Using census data, the department matched undercover officers to ethnic communities and instructed them to blend in, the officials said. Pakistani-American officers infiltrated Pakistani neighborhoods, Palestinians focused on Palestinian neighborhoods. They hung out in hookah bars and cafes, quietly observing the community around them.

The unit, which has been undisclosed now, became known inside the department as the Demographic Unit, former police officials said.

"It's not a question of profiling. It's a question of going where the problem could arise," said Mordecai Dzikansky, a retired NYPD intelligence officer who said he was aware of the Demographic Unit. "And thank God we have the capability. We have the language capability and the ethnic officers. That's our hidden weapon."

The officers did not work out of headquarters, officials said. Instead, they passed their intelligence to police handlers who knew their identities.

Cohen said he wanted the squad to "rake the coals, looking for hot spots," former officials recalled. The undercover officers soon became known inside the department as rakers.

A hot spot might be a beauty supply store selling chemicals used for making bombs. Or it might be a hawala, a broker that transfers money around the world with little documentation. Undercover officers might visit an Internet cafe and look at the browsing history on a computer, a former police official involved in the program said. If it revealed visits to radical websites, the cafe might be deemed a hot spot.

Ethnic bookstores, too, were on the list. If a raker noticed a customer looking at radical literature, he might chat up the store owner and see what he could learn. The bookstore, or even the customer, might get further scrutiny. If a restaurant patron applauds a news report about the death of U.S. troops, the patron or the restaurant could be labeled a hot spot.

The goal was to "map the city's human terrain," one law enforcement official said. The program was modeled in part on how Israeli authorities operate in the West Bank, a former police official said.

Mapping crimes has been a successful police strategy nationwide. But mapping robberies and shootings is one thing. Mapping ethnic neighborhoods is different, something that at least brushes against what the federal government considers racial profiling.

Browne, the NYPD spokesman, said the Demographic Unit does not exist. He said the department has a Zone Assessment Unit that looks for locations that could attract terrorists. But he said undercover officers only followed leads, disputing the account of several current and former police and federal officials. They do not just hang out in neighborhoods, he said.

"We will go into a location, whether it's a mosque or a bookstore, if the lead warrants it, and at least establish whether there's something that requires more attention," Browne said.

That conflicts with testimony from an undercover officer in the 2006 trial of Shahawar Matin Siraj, who was convicted of planning an attack on New York's subway system. The officer said he was instructed to live in Brooklyn and act as a "walking camera" for police.

"I was told to act like a civilian - hang out in the neighborhood, gather information," the Bangladeshi officer testified, under a false name, in what offered the first narrow glimpse at the NYPD's infiltration of ethnic neighborhoods.

Officials said such operations just made sense. Islamic terrorists had attacked the city on 9/11, so police needed people inside the city's Muslim neighborhoods. 

Officials say it does not conflict with a 2004 city law prohibiting the NYPD from using religion or ethnicity "as the determinative factor for initiating law enforcement action."
"It's not profiling," Cutter said. "It's like, after a shooting, do you go 20 blocks away and interview guys or do you go to the neighborhood where it happened?"

In 2007, the Los Angeles Police Department was criticized for even considering a similar program. The police announced plans to map Islamic neighborhoods to look for pockets of radicalization among the region's roughly 500,000 Muslims. Criticism was swift, and chief William Bratton scrapped the plan.

"A lot of these people came from countries where the police were the terrorists," Bratton said at a news conference, according to the Los Angeles Daily News. "We don't do that here. We do not want to spread fear."

In New York, current and former officials said, the lesson of that controversy was that such programs should be kept secret.

Some in the department, including lawyers, have privately expressed concerns about the raking program and how police use the information, current and former officials said. Part of the concern was that it might appear that police were building dossiers on innocent people, officials said. Another concern was that, if a case went to court, the department could be forced to reveal details about the program, putting the entire operation in jeopardy.

That's why, former officials said, police regularly shredded documents discussing rakers.

When Cohen made his case in court that he needed broader authority to investigate terrorism, he had promised to abide by the FBI's investigative guidelines. But the FBI is prohibited from using undercover agents unless there's specific evidence of criminal activity, meaning a federal raking program like the one officials described to the AP would violate FBI guidelines.

The NYPD declined to make Cohen available for comment. In an earlier interview with the AP on a variety of topics, Police Commissioner Kelly said the intelligence unit does not infringe on civil rights.

"We're doing what we believe we have to do to protect the city," he said. "We have many, many lawyers in our employ. We see ourselves as very conscious and aware of civil liberties. And we know there's always going to be some tension between the police department and so-called civil liberties groups because of the nature of what we do."

The department clashed with civil rights groups most publicly after Cohen's undercover officers infiltrated anti-war groups before the 2004 Republican National Convention in New York. A lawsuit over that program continues today.

During the convention, when protesters were arrested, police asked a list of questions which, according to court documents, included: "What are your political affiliations?" ''Do you do any kind of political work?" and "Do you hate George W. Bush?"

"At the end of the day, it's pure and simple a rogue domestic surveillance operation," said Christopher Dunn, a New York Civil Liberties Union lawyer involved in the convention lawsuit.

___
Undercover agents like the rakers were valuable, but what Cohen and Sanchez wanted most were informants.

The NYPD dedicated an entire squad, the Terrorist Interdiction Unit, to developing and handling informants. Current and former officials said Sanchez was instrumental in teaching them how to develop sources.

For years, detectives used informants known as mosque crawlers to monitor weekly sermons and report what was said, several current and former officials directly involved in the informant program said. If FBI agents were to do that, they would be in violation of the Privacy Act, which prohibits the federal government from collecting intelligence on purely First Amendment activities.

The FBI has generated its own share of controversy for putting informants inside mosques, but unlike the program described to the AP, the FBI requires evidence of a crime before an informant can be used inside a mosque.

Valerie Caproni, the FBI's general counsel, would not discuss the NYPD's programs but said FBI informants can't troll mosques looking for leads. Such operations are reviewed for civil liberties concerns, she said.

"If you're sending an informant into a mosque when there is no evidence of wrongdoing, that's a very high-risk thing to do," Caproni said. "You're running right up against core constitutional rights. You're talking about freedom of religion."

That's why senior FBI officials in New York ordered their own agents not to accept any reports from the NYPD's mosque crawlers, two retired agents said.

It's unclear whether the police department still uses mosque crawlers. Officials said that, as Muslims figured out what was going on, the mosque crawlers became cafe crawlers, fanning out into the city's ethnic hangouts.

"Someone has a great imagination," Browne, the NYPD spokesman, said. "There is no such thing as mosque crawlers."

Following the foiled subway plot, however, the key informant in the case, Osama Eldawoody, said he attended hundreds of prayer services and collected information even on people who showed no signs of radicalization.

NYPD detectives have recruited shopkeepers and nosy neighbors to become "seeded" informants who keep police up to date on the latest happenings in ethnic neighborhoods, one official directly involved in the informant program said.

The department also has a roster of "directed" informants it can tap for assignments. For instance, if a raker identifies a bookstore as a hot spot, police might assign an informant to gather information, long before there's concrete evidence of anything criminal.

To identify possible informants, the department created what became known as the "debriefing program." When someone is arrested who might be useful to the intelligence unit - whether because he said something suspicious or because he is simply a young Middle Eastern man - he is singled out for extra questioning. 

Intelligence officials don't care about the underlying charges; they want to know more about his community and, ideally, they want to put him to work.

Police are in prisons, too, promising better living conditions and help or money on the outside for Muslim prisoners who will work with them.

Early in the intelligence division's transformation, police asked the taxi commission to run a report on all the city's Pakistani cab drivers, looking for those who got licenses fraudulently and might be susceptible to pressure to cooperate, according to former officials who were involved in or briefed on the effort.

That strategy has been rejected in other cities.

Boston police once asked neighboring Cambridge for a list of Somali cab drivers, Cambridge Police Chief Robert Haas said. Haas refused, saying that without a specific reason, the search was inappropriate.

"It really has a chilling effect in terms of the relationship between the local police department and those cultural groups, if they think that's going to take place," Haas said.

The informant division was so important to the NYPD that Cohen persuaded his former colleagues to train a detective, Steve Pinkall, at the CIA's training center at the Farm. Pinkall, who had an intelligence background as a Marine, was given an unusual temporary assignment at CIA headquarters, officials said. He took the field tradecraft course alongside future CIA spies then returned to New York to run investigations.

"We found that helpful, for NYPD personnel to be exposed to the tradecraft," Browne said.

The idea troubled senior FBI officials, who saw it as the NYPD and CIA blurring the lines between police work and spying, in which undercover officers regularly break the laws of foreign governments. The arrangement even made its way to FBI Director Robert Mueller, two former senior FBI officials said, but the training was already under way and Mueller did not press the issue.
___
NYPD's intelligence operations do not stop at the city line, as the undercover operation in New Jersey made clear.

CONTINUE  READING Full Story HERE...
 

Friday, August 19, 2011

Anthony Kimery: 'LoneWolf' Terrorists Pose Growing Threat

- LIMITED DISSEMINATION
US/1


'Lone Wolf' Terrorists, Extremists Pose Growing Homeland Threat, Administration Believes
 
By: Anthony Kimery
08/18/2011 ( 9:22am)

This past week, the Obama administration launched a full court press to alert citizens, law enforcement and other federal, state and local authorities to be on the lookout for activities that could be indicative of potential terrorist plotting and extremist behavior.

Tuesday, President Barack Obama said in an interview with CNN that a "lone wolf" terror attack in the United States is much more likely today than a coordinated attack like the attack on Sept. 11, 2001.

Conceding that the federal government is in a state of heightened awareness in the run-up to the tenth anniversary of the 9/11 attack, Obama said “the biggest concern we have right now is not the launching of a major terrorist operation, although that risk is always there.”

Obama said “the risk that we're especially concerned [about] right now is the lone wolf terrorist, somebody with a single weapon being able to carry out wide-scale massacres of the sort that we saw in Norway recently. You know, when you've got one person who is deranged or driven by a hateful ideology, they can do a lot of damage, and it's a lot harder to trace those lone wolf operators."

These so-called lone wolves can be both Islamist jihadists or homegrown extremists like the Tampa, Florida student arrested this week on charges of plotting what officials said was potentially “catastrophic” bombing at his high school.

Echoing Obama, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano said Wednesday that “lone wolf" terror attacks are increasing and "much more difficult to intercept" than 9/11 magnitude plots.

In a speech at a Chamber of Commerce event, Napolitano said the US has a "layered system of security that would give us multiple ways to deter" an attack like the one on 9/11.

"What we see now is smaller plots," Napolitano stressed, adding, “we are also seeing a rise of activities by individuals who are actually in the country, and they are acting by themselves and that kind of attack is the most difficult to prevent because there is nothing to intercept."

Rep. Peter King (R-NY), chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, told WCBS 880 that when you have no “chatter” indicating a large plot, “then you [have to start looking for things like]  weapons sales. You look for, for instance, purchase of explosives. So, you try to track that down [to] see any type of unusual activity.”

Napolitano and the President’s comments coincided with DHS’ launch of public service announcements about the department’s “See Something, Say Something” initiative, and the “For Official Use Only” (FOUO) Joint Intelligence Bulletin on lone wolves issued Tuesday by the FBI Counterterrorism Analysis Section and DHS’ Intelligence & Analysis Production Branch.

Obtained by Homeland Security Today, this new intelligence bulletin, Use of Small Arms: Examining Lone Shooters and Small-Unit Tactics, updated a September 3, 2010 DHS-FBI joint analytic product of the same title that “is intended to provide warning and perspective regarding the scope of the potential terrorist threats to the United States, specifically towards US persons,” the bulletin stated.

The alert is intended “to support the activities of DHS and FBI and to help federal, state and local government counterterrorism and law enforcement officials deter, prevent, preempt or respond to terrorist attacks directed against the United States,” it stated.

The “Key Findings” of the bulletin are:

  • “The current evolving and diversified homeland threat environment and recent incidents involving small-arms operations in the United States and abroad demonstrate the need for continued vigilance and awareness. Small-arms operations could be employed through a range of tactics from a lone offender - as illustrated by the recent 22 July 2011 lone shooter attack that took place in Norway - to a coordinated small-unit attack involving several operatives;” and
  •  
  • “We continue to assess that the scale and complexity of any attack of this type is dependent on a variety of factors, to include the sophistication and training of the attackers, the parameters of their targets, and the local security environment.”

Continuing, the alert warned that “recent lone offender attacks and plots in the United States and abroad illustrate the effectiveness of the small-arms tactic and the need for continued vigilance and awareness of this tactic. Attacks by lone offenders - which by definition lack  co-conspirators, and therefore provide fewer opportunities for detection - may be more difficult for law enforcement and homeland security authorities to disrupt.”

Additionally, the bulletin warned, “incidents involving lone gunmen in the United States and abroad demonstrate the potential danger, lethality, and effectiveness of an unrehearsed small-arms attack by a single individual with little or no training, and underscore the potentially higher consequences of an assault-style attack involving multiple operatives.”

The bulletin stressed that “terrorist and violent insurgent groups overseas - in many cases operating in nations battling violent civil unrest - have long favored small-unit assault tactics, in which small teams of operatives storm a target using small arms to defeat security. The frequency of these attacks is likely attributable to perceptions of their effectiveness, the prevalence of small-arms instruction at terrorist and militant training camps, and the widespread availability of assault weapons …”

Regarding the homeland threat posed by small-unit tactics, the joint DHS-FBI bulletin issued Tuesday stated that, “given recent events demonstrating the success of small-arms tactics and the evolving, diversified threat faced by the United States from Al Qaeda and those inspired by its ideology, we assess that transnational terrorist groups and homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) could employ small-unit assault tactics in the United States.”

And “although we have no information indicating transnational terrorists have attempted to execute a small-unit assault operation in the homeland,” the bulletin stated, “we note that disrupted HVE plots … planned to employ small arms-based assault tactics.”

The bulletin noted that because of terrorists’ failure to successfully pull-off homeland attacks using improved explosive devices, or IEDs, small-unit assault tactics “may increase [their] attractiveness.”

“While terrorist organizations almost certainly will continue to attempt future homeland attacks using IEDs, it is also possible that operational planners will incorporate small-arms attacks that do not require mastery of IED construction or risk the failure of a complex bomb design,” the FBI and DHS warned.

The intelligence bulletin emphasized the importance of suspicious activity reporting, which is the cornerstone of DHS’ aggressive promotion of its “See Something, Say Something” public awareness campaign.

“We face an increased challenge in detecting terrorist plots underway by individuals or small groups acting independently or with only tenuous ties to foreign handlers,” the DHS-FBI bulletin said, noting that “recent events have illustrated that state, local, tribal and private sector partners play a critical role in identifying suspicious activities - such as unusual purchases of or inquiries about firearms, gunpowder, or ammunition - and raising the awareness of federal counterterrorism officials.”

Similarly, DHS is funding the Information Collection on Patrol (InCOP) training program to enhance the capacity of the line police officer to be able to identify and report suspicious or criminal behavior. InCOP has been adopted by major police departments across the nation.

The training is provided by the Oklahoma City-based Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), whose executive director, David Cid, is a retired career FBI official.


[Information contained in BKNT E-mail is considered Attorney-Client and Attorney Work Product privileged, copyrighted and confidential. Views that may be expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of any government, agency, or news organization.]

Wednesday, August 3, 2011

BKNT-FLASH--DOCTOR JONES & THE MISSING ASHES OF BLASPHEMY

- LIMITED DISSEMINATION
FROM: Scott Malone, Editor 

 YIKES!

[ed.note: Posted below is what we here at the BlackNET Intelligence Channel are wont to call "RAW INTELLIGENCE," as once noted in the March 19th  2003 United Press International profile of the BlackNET on the day we accurately predicted the commencement of the SECOND US and allied invasion of IRAQ.

What will the intrepid Florida evangelist think up next? His threat to immolate the Holy Koran last September 11th almost set of a FURTHER WORLD CONFLAGRATION.

Hard to top that.

But then the good Dr. Jones actually did BURN the Holy Koran after a rather pedantic "show trial." That landed the Christian Fundamentalist in the TARGET SIGHTS of various AL QAEDA internet forums, as first and exclusively reported by the BlackNET Intelligence Channel

The "U/FOUO - Law Enforcement SENSITIVE" Al Qaeda HIT_LIST the Office of the SECDEF Bob Gates wanted removed from the BlackNET Intelligence Channel Website.

We first got to meet Dr. Jones via cell when BlackNET investigator Scott Malone was the FIRST to inform him that he was now on the Al QAEDA's lastest HIT-LIST, which was considered serious enough to warrant FOUR separate SECURITY ALERTS Worldwide.

These included the "Law Enforcement Sensitive" Bulletins from the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) Protective Intelligence Investigations branch of the DoD’s Coordinator for Threat Mitigation Office. 

"I heard from you first," Dr. Jones told us. "Then the FBI called." 

And that was TWO WEEKS after the SECURITY Bulletin had been issued.

And then LAST WEEK:

BKNT--US Pastor, on Al Qaeda ‘Hit List’ for Burning Koran, Alleged Victim of Hit-and-Run Assault


Controversial Florida Pastor Terry Jones, who achieved notoriety earlier this year when he enraged Muslims by burning a copy of the Koran following a mock trial by his church that found the Islamic holy book quilty of crimes against humanity, says he was the victim of a mysterious hit-and-run assault Saturday afternoon.

Jones received scores of death threats in response to his burning of the Koran, and more recently his name appeared on a so-called "hit list" of infidels who should be killed that was drawn up by members of an Al Qaeda-linked Internet chat room for jihadists.

So it would appear yet again that there truly is no rest for wicked, whatever their WAR COLORS.

But we here at the BlackNET Intelligence Channel believe that Members should be able to judge for themselves...]
 





FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
August 3, 2011

MEDIA CONTACT: 

What should Dr. Terry Jones and Stand Up America Now! do with the charred remains of the Koran that was burned in March during International Judge the Koran Day?

1)  Auction off the remains to support the fight against radical Islam and Sharia in America?

2)  Present the remains to Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf as a rejection to the building of the Ground Zero mosque?

3)  Spread the ashes at Ground Zero?

4)  Present the burned remains to President Obama?

If you have ideas or suggestions, please send them in an e-mail to Stand Up America Now! at info@standupamericanow.org

United States
[Information contained in BKNT E-mail is considered Attorney-Client and Attorney Work Product privileged, copyrighted and confidential. Views that may be expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of any government, agency, or news organization.]


- flash- LIMITED DISSEMINATION
ATTN: HST/2; NSW/1&2

FROM: Scott Malone, Editor

[NO DISSEMINATION [Lifted]  [ed.note:  Dr. Terry Jones is famous the word over for not only inflammatory rhetoric, but for being just plain inflammatory, particularly when it comes to the holy Koran.

What is NOT publicly known is that he earned a prominent place the Al Qaeda CyBER-JIHAD ‘Hit-List,’ according to the U/FOUO Terror Alert Bulletins put out by the FBI, DHS, DoD and CFIX in early JUNE. He and his flock were first to learn of this serious Al Qaeda death threat from BlackNET Investigators. 
  
Only then did the FBI call him, more than TWO weeks post-THREAT Bulletin issuance. Our Member joint article for BlackNET Intelligence Channel and Homeland Security Today,

W. Scott Malone and Anthony L. Kimery: NEW DETAILS - Al Qaeda HIT LIST Names NAMED... http://blacknetintel.blogspot.com/2011/06/w-scott-malone-and-anthony-l-kimery-new.html


…specifically did NOT mention Dr. Jones by name. And the actual documents, though appropriately sanitized as regards Dr. Jones, were taken down from the BlackNET site in response to early morning phone calls from several Members on behalf of the SECDEF and  OSD.

We have been planning for several weeks to do an EXCLUSIVE Interview on this very subject with Dr. Jones via Skype (as soon as US/1 learns how—apologies to certain Florida Members).

Dr. Jones was the only “civilian” on the 58-name assassination list, in that he was neither a Pentagon official, military commander, Member of Congress or defense contractor.

[edit]

We pray for his speedy recovery and implore him to ALWAYS travel safely…
NO DISSEMINATION, ABOVE [Lifted]. OPEN SOURCE below.] 


July 23, 2011


Dr. Terry Jones, Founder and President of Stand Up America Now was the victim of a hit-and-run attack Saturday afternoon, July 23, around 1:45pm ET. 

Dr. Jones suffered minor injuries in the attack.
A black SUV sped around him hitting his leg and running over his foot as he was stopped at an intersection while on his motorcycle.  The SUV, with Georgia plates, then sped away quickly.  Dr. Jones, noticed the SUV following him for a few miles before the attack.

Dr. Terry Jones' account of the hit-and-run incident:
As we left the church, we turned right and came straight down as we went through the wooded area and came to the stop sign where you must turn left or right. I noticed that there was a black SUV behind us. Of course because of our situation, we always are aware of things and people who are following us.  


“As we turned left, they turned left. They were a little bit suspicious as they kept speeding up and backing off, speeding up and backing off. We continued on down the road a few miles. As we approached the next intersection, the next stop light, and as I was slowing down, they passed me slowly on the right hand side literally only inches away from my motorcycle. I kept it straight and yelled at them. This was done on purpose as there was absolutely no need for this.

It was a black SUV with a Georgia license plate. As I stopped, they ran over my leg, my foot. I yelled out at them. They gave it no absolutely no attention. Although no window was down, they knew very well that they had hit me. They proceeded to turn to the right and to speed up very, very fast. It was a definite attempt of some form on my life, either to give us a warning, a scare, or to actually do bodily harm which they did by running over my leg. We will [sic] reported this to the Florida Highway Patrol and to the FBI.”

[Information contained in BKNT E-mail is considered Attorney-Client and Attorney Work Product privileged, copyrighted and confidential. Views that may be expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of any government, agency, or news organization.]

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